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Can and Should Universal Injunctions 
Be Saved? 
 
The practice of a federal district court judge halting the govern-
ment’s enforcement of an executive action against not only the parties 
before the court but against anyone, anywhere, may be coming to an end. 
Multiple Supreme Court Justices have expressed their skepticism in the 
propriety of universal injunctions. The growing scholarly consensus is 
that there should be a brightline rule against them. If the universal in-
junction’s demise is impending and the class action’s demise continues 
unabated, obtaining systemwide relief may be difficult when such relief 
may be most needed.  
This Note considers whether universal injunctions can and 
should be saved. It first compares the macro-level trends and current 
tradeoffs between the two procedural choices for seeking systemwide re-
lief. Then, this Note considers whether universal injunctions can be the-
oretically justified based on the development of issue preclusion doctrine 
and the drafting of the modern class action rules. Finally, this Note pro-
poses a specialized forum to adjudicate universal injunction suits that 
would solve the two most pressing problems caused by such injunc-
tions—judge shopping and preclusion asymmetry—and realign the 
tradeoffs that plaintiffs consider when choosing how to seek systemwide 
relief. 
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When one invokes a law before the courts of the United 
States that the judge deems contrary to the Constitution, 
he can therefore refuse to apply it. This power is the only 
one which is particular to the American magistrate, but a 
great political influence flows from it . . . . If the judge had 
been able to attack laws in a theoretical and general man-
ner, if he had been able to take the initiative and censure 
the legislature, he would have entered onto the political 
stage with a bang; having become the champion or adver-
sary of one party, he would have appealed to all the pas-
sions that divide the country to take part in the conflict. 
 
 —Alexis de Tocqueville1 
 
 1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96–97 (Harvey Mansfield & Delba Win-
throp eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In April 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions expressed 
his amazement2 that “a judge sitting on an island in the Pacific” could 
stop President Donald Trump from fulfilling a key campaign promise: 
enacting a so-called Muslim Ban.3 Sessions was adding to the growing 
skepticism that a federal district court judge—sometimes handpicked 
based on his perceived outlier views4—could grant a “universal injunc-
tion”5 to immediately halt the enforcement of an executive action6 
against not only the parties before the court but also against anyone, 
anywhere.7 When the final version of the Muslim Ban reached the Su-
preme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote sep-
arately to urge the Court to address the propriety of universal injunc-
tions which he deemed “legally and historically dubious.”8 Justice Neil 
Gorsuch also signaled his disapproval of these extraordinary remedies 
by sardonically referring to them as “cosmic injunctions” during oral 
 
 2. Attorney General Sessions’s criticism shows that universal injunctions are hard to re-
move from their politically salient context. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th 
Cir. 2018) (“[In 2016], then-Senator and now-Attorney General Sessions characterized the uphold-
ing of one such nationwide preliminary injunction as ‘a victory for the American people and for the 
rule of law.’ Now, many who advocated for broad injunctions in those Obamaera cases are opposing 
them.” (citation omitted)), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 
WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 
2018). 
 3. Samantha Schmidt, Hawaii Residents to Jeff Sessions: ‘We’re not Just Some Island’, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/04/21/hawaiians-to-jeff-sessions-were-not-just-some-island/?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.8e705ee833e6 [https://perma.cc/9YW5-CE9L]; see also Jeff Sessions, Nation-
wide Injunctions Are a Threat to Our Constitutional Order, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2018, 12:20 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/nationwide-injunctions-stop-elected-branches-enforc-
ing-law/ [https://perma.cc/24AN-7HC6]. 
 4. See infra Section I.A.2. 
 5. The literature uses both “nationwide” and “universal” to describe injunctions that enjoin 
the enforcement of an executive action against anyone, anywhere. This Note follows the lead of 
Justice Clarence Thomas and uses the term “universal.” See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 
2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“ ‘Nationwide injunctions’ is perhaps the more common 
term. But I use the term ‘universal injunctions’ in this opinion because it is more precise. These 
injunctions are distinctive because they prohibit the Government from enforcing a policy with re-
spect to anyone, including nonparties—not because they have wide geographic breadth.”); see also 
Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They 
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 349–53 (2018) (arguing against using the 
term “nationwide” to describe the injunctions at issue). 
 6. This Note uses the term “executive action” to refer to all executive orders, presidential 
proclamations, executive memorandums, administrative agency rules, and similar authority. 
 7. Cf. Sessions, supra note 3 (“During the New Deal controversies, courts concluded that one 
new tax was unconstitutional more than 1,600 times. They issued more than 1,600 injunctions—
each applying only to the plaintiff in the case.”). 
 8. 138 S. Ct. at 2426–29 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the “authority to provide 
equitable relief is meaningfully constrained. This authority must comply with longstanding prin-
ciples of equity that predate this country’s founding.”). 
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argument.9 Chief Justice John Roberts previously voiced similar con-
cerns.10 
Even though the Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the 
propriety of universal injunctions,11 some lower courts have interpreted 
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”)12 as an en-
dorsement of the remedy, citing the decision to justify their own univer-
sal injunctions.13 The Court in IRAP first recognized that “[c]rafting a 
preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often 
dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of 
the legal issues it presents.”14 The Court then only slightly narrowed 
the district court’s universal injunction against the Muslim Ban by leav-
ing it in place for “foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona 
fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”15 Never-
theless, the endorsement was tepid at best, and the Court’s rebuke of 
universal injunctions could be impending.16 
 The growing scholarly consensus is that there should be a 
brightline rule against universal injunctions because historical limits 
on judicial power and the constitutional and structural constraints on 
 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 73, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), https://www.su-
premecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/17-965_l5gm.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
KK5R-CSUR] (“We have this troubling rise of this nationwide injunction, cosmic injunction . . . not 
limited to relief for the parties at issue or even a class action.”). 
 10. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (“[T]his Court is not responsible for vindi-
cating generalized partisan preferences. The Court’s constitutionally prescribed role is to vindicate 
the individual rights of the people appearing before it.”). 
 11. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider 
the propriety of the nationwide scope of the injunction issued by the District Court.”). 
 12. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
 13. See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (E. Bay I), 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 866–67 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 14. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087. 
 15. Id. at 2088. 
 16.  Andrew Coan & David Marcus, Article III, Remedies, and Representation, 9 
CONLAWNOW 97, 98 (2018): 
A majority of the justices implicitly approved—or at least failed to disapprove—injunc-
tive relief well beyond what was necessary to remedy the particularized injuries of the 
only plaintiffs actually before the Court. As the three dissenters pointed out, persons 
similarly situated to the plaintiffs are, by definition, not the plaintiffs. 
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federal courts prohibit equitable remedies from intentionally17 benefit-
ing nonparties.18 The Department of Justice has advised federal prose-
cutors to oppose universal injunctions in every case.19 Furthermore, a 
member of Congress has introduced legislation that would create a 
brightline rule against the remedy.20 Some commentators and judges 
readily point to a different procedural mechanism when decrying uni-
versal injunctions: the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class action.21 They as-
sert that if an individual plaintiff can secure broad injunctive relief that 
intentionally benefits nonparties, the 23(b)(2) class action is arguably 
superfluous.22 
The rapid rise of universal injunctions has occurred simultane-
ously with the rise of sweeping public policy initiatives enacted through 
executive action.23 Universal injunctions halted a few of President 
Bush’s executive actions and many of President Obama’s.24 President 
 
 17. Injunctions dealing with “indivisible rights” often incidentally benefit nonparties. A right 
is indivisible if it is impossible to enforce it for only a particular plaintiff without also enforcing it 
for nonparties. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2427 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[His-
torically], American courts of equity did not provide relief beyond the parties to the case. If their 
injunctions advantaged nonparties, that benefit was merely incidental. Injunctions barring public 
nuisances were an example.”); Wasserman, supra note 5, at 371–73 (discussing indivisible rights 
in cases involving desegregation, voter identification laws, and prison conditions). 
 18. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017) (proposing a brightline rule against universal injunctions); Wasser-
man, supra note 5, at 353–85 (same). Professors Amanda Frost and Suzette Malveaux have ques-
tioned Professor Bray’s proposed brightline rule. Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunc-
tions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, Response, Class Actions, Civil Rights, 
and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 56 (2017). 
 19. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Civil Litig. Components & U.S. 
Attorneys on Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the Possibility for Nationwide Injunctions 
2 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1093881/download 
[https://perma.cc/CVG7-W5UJ]. 
 20. Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2019, H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019) (stating that 
no federal district court shall issue “an order that purports to restrain the enforcement against a 
non-party of any statute, regulation, order, or similar authority unless the non-party is repre-
sented by a party acting in a representative capacity pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure”). 
 21. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that a universal injunction is improper when “[n]o class has been certified, and neither 
party asks for the scope of relief” to extend to an “unidentified, unnamed group”); see also Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual 
rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’ ”). 
 22. See Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
487, 553 (2016) (“If the court concludes that a Defendant-Oriented Injunction would be the appro-
priate remedy, it should require the plaintiffs to re-file the case as a Rule 23(b)(2) class ac-
tion . . . .”); see also infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Executive Orders, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (last 
updated Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/executive-orders 
[https://perma.cc/FS2A-VMLY]. 
 24. See Bray, supra note 18, at 458–60 (discussing five universal injunctions granted by 
Texas federal district courts in one year during the Obama administration). 
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Trump’s policy agenda faced twenty-five universal injunctions in his 
first two years in office.25 But robust judicial review of the democratic 
branches of government that can secure systemwide relief is increas-
ingly important in the face of growing, unchecked executive power26 and 
the erosion of the political process.27 If the universal injunction’s demise 
is impending and the class action’s demise continues unabated, obtain-
ing systemwide relief may be difficult when such relief may be most 
needed.28 
 This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the doctri-
nal basics of injunctive relief and class certification, then explains how 
courts have interpreted and applied these doctrines in ways that have 
caused the rapid rise of universal injunctions and the slow demise of 
class actions. Part II considers the tradeoffs litigants currently face 
when choosing whether to file a universal injunction suit or a class ac-
tion suit by examining two challenges to President Trump’s executive 
actions on asylum policy. Part III considers whether the development 
of issue preclusion doctrine and the drafting of the modern class action 
rules can justify universal injunctions and their preclusive asymmetry 
on theoretical grounds.29 Part IV proposes the creation of a specialized 
 
 25. See Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks Announcing 
New Memo on Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attor-
ney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-new-memo-nationwide-injunctions 
[https://perma.cc/G4P5-AURA]. 
26.  See Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop 
and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1698 (2019) (arguing that the role of the judiciary “includes 
ensuring that one branch, such as the executive, does not exceed the scope of its constitutionally 
assigned authority by invading the turf of another, such as when an agency ignores statutory di-
rectives imposed by Congress, a co-equal branch of government”); see also Gillian E. Metzger, 
Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1752–53 (2015) (noting that po-
litical polarization leads to “an increase in presidential assertions of policymaking authority and 
control over agencies”). 
 27. See generally Coan & Marcus, supra note 16, at 104 (“[I]t is possible that the democratic 
process is still preferable to the courts, which have their own shortcomings. But the faith in ma-
joritarian politics undergirding the representation-centered approach [to Article III standing] is at 
best naïve, at worst willfully blind to the failings of the democratic process.”); Suzanna Sherry, 
Why We Need More Judicial Activism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT 
OF MODERATION 11, 18 (Giorgi Areshidze et al. eds., 2016) (“The courts should stand in the way of 
democratic majorities, in order to keep majority rule from degenerating into majority tyr-
anny. . . . [M]ost people . . . do not realize how strongly counter-majoritarian, even anti-demo-
cratic, the founders were.”).  
 28. Metzger, supra note 26, at 1759 (“[C]ourts may see congressional dysfunction as instead 
increasing the need for a judicial check to prevent executive branch unilateralism and aggrandize-
ment.”). 
 29. Two forthcoming articles have analogized preclusion doctrine to universal injunctions but 
did not consider spurious class actions and counterarguments to the analogy. Zachary D. Clopton, 
Nationwide Injunctions and Preclusion, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290345 [https://perma.cc/Q93A-CC76]; Alan M. 
Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290838 [https://perma.cc/P7EP-9VSQ]. 
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forum of twelve “borrowed” district court judges that would be randomly 
assigned to three-judge panels to adjudicate suits seeking universal in-
junctions against federal executive action.30 The forum would solve the 
two most pressing problems caused by universal injunctions: forum 
shopping that can lead to judge shopping and preclusive asymmetry. 
I. THE MACRO-LEVEL TRENDS IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
 Part I first briefly summarizes the doctrinal basics of injunctive 
relief and class certification, then explains how courts have interpreted 
and applied these doctrines in ways that have caused the rapid rise of 
universal injunctions and the slow demise of class actions.  
A. The Rapid Rise of Universal Injunctions 
1. Indeterminate Equitable Principles 
 Injunctions31 are an equitable remedy that control the defend-
ant’s conduct.32 An injunction can be either “mandatory,” requiring the 
defendant to act affirmatively, or “prohibitory,” requiring the defendant 
to refrain from acting.33 A preliminary injunction maintains the legal 
status quo as the case proceeds in order to prevent imminent and irrep-
arable injury.34 
 
 30. A specialized or single forum for universal injunctions is only mentioned in passing in the 
current literature. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 18, at 1105–06; The Role and Impact of Nationwide 
Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Courts, Intellectual Prop., 
and the Internet, 117th Cong. 7 (2017) (statement of Hans A. von Spakovsky):  
[D]ue to the importance of voting rights, federal law provides that such cases shall be 
heard by a three-judge panel, at least one of whom is a circuit court judge. It would be 
hard to argue that cases involving government policies that affect the other rights of 
citizens are any less important. 
 31. There are important differences between temporary restraining orders, preliminary in-
junctions, and permanent injunctions, but this Note does not distinguish among them. Most, if not 
all, of the injunctions discussed herein are preliminary injunctions. For a discussion of the differ-
ences between Rule 65(a) preliminary injunctions and Rule 65(b) temporary restraining orders, 
see 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (3d ed. 2018). 
 32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2) (listing three groups of persons who can be bound by an in-
junction). Professor Michael Morley distinguishes plaintiff-orientated from defendant-orientated 
injunctions. See Morley, supra note 22, at 490. 
 33. 2 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY 
§ VIII, Rule 65 (Westlaw Feb. 2019 update). 
 34. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 2947; see also Spencer E. Amdur & David Haus-
man, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 49, 51 (2017) 
(“Some government policies, like President Trump’s travel ban, threaten immediate and lasting 
damage. They go into effect quickly, and their impact cannot be reversed at the end of a lawsuit.”). 
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 Courts have broad equitable power to order injunctive relief at 
different stages of litigation.35 They generally consider the following 
four factors when ordering preliminary injunctive relief: (1) whether the 
party seeking the injunction is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 
whether the party seeking the injunction is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of such relief; (3) whether the balance of equities 
favors the party seeking an injunction; and (4) whether the injunction 
is in the public interest.36 When the government is a party, the last two 
factors merge.37 The party bound by a preliminary injunction can seek 
immediate appellate review.38 Orders denying or granting preliminary 
injunctive relief are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and 
are therefore rarely overturned or modified; however, the ongoing schol-
arly criticism of universal injunctions may have inspired appellate 
courts to review such orders with more scrutiny.39 
There are two common law equitable principles that guide courts 
in crafting the scope of injunctions or, in other words, which parties the 
federal government cannot enforce the executive action against: the 
complete relief principle and the extent of the violation principle.40 
However, these principles can be cited both in support of and in opposi-
tion to granting a universal injunction.41 
 The complete relief principle dictates that an injunction should 
be “no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 
complete relief to the plaintiffs.”42 Courts often invoke the principle to 
issue broad injunctions in suits involving the movement of people across 
 
 35. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). 
 36. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); FED. R. CIV. P. 65 Practice 
Commentary (“The test in each circuit is based on essentially the same traditional equitable 
grounds—primarily irreparable harm and likelihood of success—but preliminary injunction prac-
tice varies greatly across the circuits.”). 
 37. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 2948. 
 39. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, § 2948. See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 
No. 19-16487, 2019 WL 3850928 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019) (holding that the universal scope of an 
injunction was not supported by the evidentiary record); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 
897 F.3d 1225, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 2018) (vacating the universal scope of an injunction); City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018) (narrowing a universal 
injunction to apply to the City of Chicago only); see also infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 40. Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in 
Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2030–34 (2015); Wasserman, supra note 5, at 354. 
 41. Bray, supra note 18, at 467 (“[T]he complete-relief principle can be taken by courts as a 
constraint on national injunctions or an impetus to give them, which is to say that it is no con-
straint at all.”). 
 42. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). 
       
2019] FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS 1683 
state lines43 or harms that cross geographic boundaries.44 But the prin-
ciple perhaps should counsel against granting broad injunctions. If com-
plete relief were a true limiting principle, the scope of an injunction 
would extend only as far as necessary to remedy the plaintiff’s injuries 
that confer Article III standing.45 
Two recent challenges to exemptions from the Affordable Care 
Act’s (“ACA”) contraceptive mandate illustrate the indeterminacy of the 
complete relief principle. In one challenge in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania and New Jersey sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of these exemptions which significantly expanded the cate-
gories of employers who could opt out of providing no-cost contraceptive 
coverage on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convic-
tions.46 The two states alleged they would suffer financial harm from an 
increase in unintended pregnancies and women that would turn to 
state-funded contraceptive services as more private healthcare entities 
qualified for the exemptions.47 
The federal government argued that an injunction limited in 
scope to Pennsylvania and New Jersey would provide complete relief.48 
The district court disagreed and granted a universal injunction.49 It rea-
soned that a narrower injunction would not benefit thousands of New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania citizens that travelled across state lines to 
work for out-of-state entities and would not reach out-of-state students 
at Pennsylvania and New Jersey state universities who would lose pri-
 
 43. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 787–88 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Government has 
not proposed a workable alternative . . . that accounts for the nation’s multiple ports of entry and 
interconnected transit system and that would protect the proprietary interests of the States at 
issue here while nevertheless applying only within the States’ borders.”), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 377; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here is a substantial 
likelihood that a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because [Deferred Action 
for Parents of Americans] beneficiaries would be free to move among states.”). 
 44. See Frost, supra note 18, at 1093 (“The obligation to provide complete relief to the plaintiff 
also justifies nationwide injunctions in cases involving issues that cross state lines—such as pol-
lution of the air or water, tainted food, or defective products.”). 
 45. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 731 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“A plaintiff cannot sidestep Article III’s requirements by combining a request for injunctive relief 
for which he has standing with a request for injunctive relief for which he lacks standing.”); see 
also Morley, supra note 22, at 523–27. 
 46. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 802 (E.D. Pa. 2019).  
 47. Id. at 807. The states also had “special solicitude” in the Article III standing analysis 
under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Pennsylvania, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 805–06; see 
also Texas, 809 F.3d at 154 (holding that the plaintiff states were entitled to special solicitude). 
This is important because states have repeatedly sought universal injunctions against federal ex-
ecutive action and have asserted a variety of injuries to satisfy Article III standing. 
 48. Pennsylvania, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 833. 
 49. Id. at 835. 
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vate contraceptive coverage and turn to state-funded contraceptive ser-
vices.50 However, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a universal injunction 
against the same exemptions and reached the opposite conclusion on 
the scope of the injunction.51 The Ninth Circuit narrowed the district 
court’s universal injunction because, in its view, an injunction limited 
to the plaintiff states52 was enough to provide complete relief for their 
alleged injuries.53 
The second equitable principle that guides courts in crafting the 
scope of injunctive relief is the extent of the violation principle. It dic-
tates that an injunction’s scope should match “the extent of the [consti-
tutional] violation established.”54 Judge Richard Posner described the 
principle as follows: “When the court believes the underlying right to be 
highly significant, it may write injunctive relief as broad as the right 
itself.”55 The principle counsels toward granting universal injunctions 
where the suit “presents essentially a facial challenge to a policy applied 
nationwide” and implicates immigration policy, separation of powers, 
or other constitutional concerns.56 
 
 50. Id. at 833–34. 
 51. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 584 (9th Cir. 2018). Pennsylvania and California are 
also illustrative of two potential procedural problems with universal injunctions: the risk of con-
flicting injunctions and the loss of percolation. It was theoretically possible for the courts to grant 
conflicting injunctions which could have resulted in the government being held in contempt of 
court regardless of which injunction it obeyed. But see Frost, supra note 18, at 1106–07 (noting 
that the risk of conflicting injunctions is very low). Furthermore, these two cases show that a uni-
versal injunction in one case does not necessary foreclose other courts from weighing in on the 
executive action. See id. at 1107–09 (discussing other universal injunctions that did not stymie 
percolation). 
 52. The plaintiff states were California, Delaware, Virginia, Maryland, and New York. Cali-
fornia, 911 F.3d at 566. 
 53. Id. at 584. The different outcomes in these cases may be partially explained by the evi-
dentiary records before each court when ruling on the motions for a preliminary injunction. In 
Pennsylvania, the court cited to amicus briefs and other documents that showed Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey had sizeable percentages of citizens who worked out of state and thousands of out-of-
state students at their state universities. 351 F. Supp. 3d at 832. In contrast, the court in Califor-
nia noted that the record did not support a universal injunction because “while the record before 
the district court was voluminous on the harm to the plaintiffs, it was not developed as to the 
economic impact on other states.” 911 F.3d at 584. 
 54. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated 
by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”); 
Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1118 
(2010) (“The scope of the allegedly wrongful practice defines the scope of the indivisible remedy. 
And the scope of the remedy, in turn, gives rise to demands for some vehicle to determine conclu-
sively the legality of the [generally applicable] practice in question.” (citation omitted)). 
 55. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.4(6) (2d ed. 1993)). 
 56. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in 
part, opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 
17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018); Wasserman, supra note 5, at 356:  
       
2019] FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS 1685 
Dissenting on the merits in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Sonia So-
tomayor ostensibly relied on the extent of the violation principle.57 Jus-
tice Sotomayor briefly remarked that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting a universal injunction due to the Ban’s deleteri-
ous effects on both national security and the country’s healthcare and 
education systems.58 The injunction’s universal scope was necessary 
given “the nature of the Establishment Clause violation.”59 However, in 
challenges to federal executive action, the extent of the violation is al-
ways nationwide, so the principle provides little guidance on how to 
craft narrower relief.60 
In sum, the complete relief and extent of the violation principles 
have led to the rapid rise of universal injunctions because judges with 
already broad equitable discretion do not treat them as true limiting 
principles. 
2. Judge Shopping 
The lack of any true limiting principles to guide judges’ broad 
equitable discretion in determining the scope of injunctive relief can be 
compounded by plaintiffs handpicking judges. This handpicking is pos-
sible because the federal government is subject to suit in numerous ven-
ues.61 The general venue provision states that venue is proper in a ju-
dicial district where “any defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of” the forum state or where “a substantial part of the events 
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”62 In comparison, the 
venue provision specific to suits against the federal government, its 
 
In rejecting the government’s argument for a non-universal injunction in Chicago, the 
district court insisted that a narrower injunction would ‘allow the Attorney General to 
impose what this Court has ruled are likely unconstitutional conditions across a num-
ber of jurisdictions’ and to ‘continue enforcing likely invalid conditions’ against other 
cities and counties. 
 57. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2342 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 2446. 
 59. Id. at 2446 n.13. 
 60. Carroll, supra note 40, at 2031 (noting that the extent of the violation principle suggests 
that “proof of a common claim should usually result in system-wide relief, even in a non-class 
action; the very nature of a generally applicable policy or practice implies that the defendant will, 
unless enjoined, expose others to the same unlawful treatment on a system-wide basis”); see also 
Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2144 (2017). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2012). 
 62. Id. § 1391(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added). Section 1391(b) also provides for proper venue 
where any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction if there is otherwise no jurisdic-
tion in which venue is proper. Id. § 1391(b)(3). 
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agencies, officers, and employees states that venue is proper in a judi-
cial district where (1) only one of the defendants resides;63 (2) “a sub-
stantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim oc-
curred”;64 or, most notably, (3) “the plaintiff resides if no real property 
is involved in the action.”65 
These permissive venue rules for suits against the federal gov-
ernment, local rules for judicial assignments,66 and the division of judi-
cial districts into smaller geographic divisions67 have allowed litigants 
not only to forum shop but also to judge shop in universal injunction 
suits.68 While forum shopping is both a feature and a bug of a decen-
tralized judicial system,69 judge shopping erodes the legitimacy of the 
judiciary.70 This delegitimization is compounded by the fact that uni-
versal injunctions are often sought by ideological litigants against 
sweeping executive actions with great political salience. 
 For example, Texas and a handful of other states filed suit in 
the Brownsville Division of the Southern District of Texas and were 
granted a universal injunction against President Obama’s executive ac-
tion that expanded DACA and introduced Deferred Action for Parents 
 
 63. Id. § 1391(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. § 1391(e)(1)(B). 
 65. Id. § 1391(e)(1)(C) (emphasis added). 
 66. E.g., Division of Work Order, In re Division of Work Order for 2014, General Order No. 
2013-13 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2014); see also Andrew Kent, Nationwide Injunctions and the Lower 
Federal Courts, LAWFARE (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:02 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nationwide-in-
junctions-and-lower-federal-courts/ [https://perma.cc/T873-HXHV]:  
Judge-shopping is harder in districts where many federal district judges sit in the same 
courthouse, as happens in large cities. But judge shopping is sometimes possible even 
there. For instance, two very liberal judges sitting in New York City . . . have been ac-
cused of using a local rule about ‘related’ cases to allow attorneys to steer particular 
litigation to themselves. 
 67. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 124 (2012) (dividing Texas into judicial districts and divisions). 
 68. Alex Botoman, Note, Divisional Judge-Shopping, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 297, 300–
08 (2018) (arguing that Texas selected particular divisions of federal district courts to secure spe-
cific judges in suits seeking universal injunctions against President Obama’s DACA and DAPA 
initiatives, bathroom policy for transgender students, and overtime pay rules).   
 69. See  Frost, supra note 18, at 1105–06; Malveaux, supra note 18, at 57. 
 70. See Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum-shopping, Po-
liticizing Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, GEO. MASON L. REV.  
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 40), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3231456 
[https://perma.cc/4CCY-7UBA] (“[W]idespread use of nationwide injunctions . . . especially in 
cases infected with partisan, political overtones—ignores that risk, effectively replacing the tri-
partite constitutional structure with one that puts courts in the position of overall political over-
seers.”). 
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of Americans (“DAPA”).71 It was virtually certain72 that the case would 
be assigned to Judge Andrew Hanen, who had previously criticized the 
Obama Administration’s immigration policies.73 A year later, when 
Texas sought a universal injunction against the Obama Administra-
tion’s bathroom policy for transgender students, it filed suit in the Wich-
ita Falls Division of the Northern District of Texas.74 The case landed 
on the docket of Judge Reed O’Connor, the only judge presiding over 
civil cases in the Wichita Falls Division at the time of the suit.75 Judge 
O’Connor had a judicial record of invalidating agency actions that ex-
panded LGBTQ protections,76 and he granted a universal injunction af-
ter finding that the word “sex” in Title IX referred to biological sex at 
birth.77 In fact, Judge O’Connor granted universal injunctions against 
five separate Obama executive actions.78 
In sum, courts have two indeterminate equitable principles for 
crafting the scope of injunctive relief. This lack of any true limiting prin-
ciples is then compounded by plaintiffs handpicking judges who may 
have outlier views. Part IV offers a solution to preserve universal in-
junction suits but eliminate judge shopping: a specialized forum of 
twelve “borrowed” district court judges that would be randomly as-
signed to three-judge panels to adjudicate suits seeking universal in-
junctions against executive action. 
 
 71. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The decision was 
later affirmed by split decisions in the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court. Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). 
 72. Botoman, supra note 68, at 301–03 (“At the time that Texas filed suit, all civil cases in 
Brownsville were assigned to either Judge Andrew Hanen or Senior Judge Hilda Tagle.”). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Nava-Martinez, No. B-13-441-1, 2013 WL 8844097, at *3 n.4 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2013) (“[T]he DHS should cease telling the citizens of the United States that it 
is enforcing our border security laws because it is clearly not. Even worse, it is helping those who 
violate these laws.”). 
 74. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 
810 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 7:16-cv-00054-O), 2016 WL 3023276. 
 75. Botoman, supra note 68, at 305. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 832–33, 836 (“The Court concludes this injunction should apply 
nationwide. As the separate facilities provision . . . is permissive, states that authorize schools to 
define sex to include gender identity for purposes of providing separate [restrooms] will not be 
impacted by it.”). 
 78. Emma Platoff, By Gutting Obamacare, Judge Reed O’Connor Handed Texas a Win. It 
Wasn’t the First Time, TEX.  TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.texastrib-
une.org/2018/12/19/reed-oconnor-federal-judge-texas-obamacare-forum-shopping-ken-paxton/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WKN-NMEU] (“For some years, O’Connor was the only district judge hearing 
cases in the state’s tiny Wichita Falls division. Texas filed five challenges to the federal govern-
ment there in 2015 and 2016; O’Connor heard all five.”). 
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B. The Slow Demise of Class Actions 
1. Rule 23 Prerequisites 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) enumerates four prereq-
uisites for all class actions—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy.79 While there is no magic number to satisfy numerosity, the 
class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impractica-
ble.”80 Commonality requires “questions of law or fact”81 that can “gen-
erate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”82 A 
single significant question of law or fact is enough, particularly when 
the action challenges a systemwide government policy or practice.83 
Typicality focuses on the similarity of facts and issues between the ab-
sent class members and the named plaintiffs.84 It asks whether the 
claims are “so interrelated that the interests of the class members will 
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”85 And finally, the 
adequacy requirement probes whether the named plaintiffs and their 
counsel have any conflicts of interest with the absent class members 
and whether they will litigate the suit with “zeal and competence.”86 
The inquiry into the adequacy of class counsel is guided by the criteria 
enumerated in Rule 23(g): investigative efforts, class action litigation 
experience, knowledge of applicable law, and resources. At bottom, the 
adequacy, typicality, and commonality prerequisites will often overlap 
factually and conceptually. 
 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition to the four “explicit” prerequisites of Rule 23, numerous 
courts also have an “implicit” prerequisite that the proposed class be ascertainable, meaning that 
the class members must be identifiable under some objective standard. ROBERT H. KLONOFF, 
CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 39 (4th ed. 2017); see also 1 STEVEN S. 
GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY § IV, Rule 23 (Westlaw 
Feb. 2019 update): 
Some circuits extend [ascertainability] further, holding that a class cannot be certified 
if the proposed class is defined in a way that would necessitate extensive, individualized 
fact-finding simply to know who the class members are. Most circuits, however, have 
rejected this extension. . . . Ascertainability is generally an issue in (b)(3) class actions 
but not in (b)(2) class actions. 
(citations omitted). 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 82. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, 
Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
 83. Id. at 359; see also Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 12, 
Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Jun. 26, 2018). 
 84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring that “the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class”).  
 85. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349 n.5. 
 86. Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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 In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s four general prerequisites, 
the suit must also fit into a specific type of class action under Rule 
23(b).87 A (b)(2) class action is proper when “the party opposing the class 
has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, 
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is ap-
propriate respecting the class as a whole.”88 Unlike damages in a (b)(3) 
class action, injunctive relief in a (b)(2) class action is indivisible, bene-
fits each and every class member, and is based on a government policy 
or practice that applies uniformly to the class.89 Notice to class members 
and an opportunity to opt out are not required in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class 
actions.90  
2. Collateral Damage to the 23(b)(2) Class Action 
 The (b)(2) injunctive class action was created by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules (“Committee”) in 1966 to, in part, ease the 
procedural challenges litigants faced in desegregating schools after 
Brown v. Board of Education.91 After Brown, recalcitrant school dis-
tricts replaced “de jure policies of segregation” with “pupil placement 
laws” that allowed school boards to individually assign black students 
to black schools.92 These laws were later buttressed by “freedom of 
choice plans” which purportedly gave black students the choice to trans-
fer schools after an initial assignment.93 When class action suits chal-
lenged these practices, segregationist judges readily accepted the idea 
that any particular student’s assignment to any particular school was 
an individualized determination with no common questions of law or 
 
 87. PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, CLASS ACTIONS: OVERVIEW; PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 
OVERVIEW 2-529-7368 (Westlaw 2019).  
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 89. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361–62.  
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(a) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court 
may direct appropriate notice to the class.”); see also FED R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 
to 2003 amendment (“There is no right to request exclusion from a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class. The char-
acteristics of the class may reduce the need for formal notice. The cost of providing notice, moreo-
ver, could easily cripple actions that do not seek damages.”).  
 91. See FED R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments (“Illustrative are 
various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully 
against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”). For a com-
prehensive discussion of the origins of the (b)(2) class action and its lack of notice and opt-out 
provisions, see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for 
the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
 92. Marcus, supra note 91, at 683–84. 
 93. Id. at 688.  
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fact and denied class certification.94 In response, the Committee was 
determined to draft a class action rule that could produce a judgment 
that benefited and bound all class members.95 The result was Rule 
23(b)(2), which has been left unchanged since its adoption in 1966.96 
 Commentators have long predicted the demise of certain types 
of class actions.97 These predictions are based on congressional98 and 
judicial hostility toward the (b)(3) damages class action for allegedly fa-
cilitating “blackmail” and “sweetheart” settlements99 that threaten cor-
porations with bankruptcy at the hands of a single jury and enrich 
plaintiffs’ attorneys at the expense of the harmed class members.100 Pro-
fessor Maureen Carroll has argued that the hostility toward the (b)(3) 
damages class action has motivated myopic “across-the-board” changes 
that have inadvertently made (b)(2) class certification more difficult.101 
These changes include making class certification decisions subject to 
interlocutory review,102 raising the burden of proof for class certifica-
tion, setting higher ascertainability standards,103 and imposing a 
heightened commonality requirement.104  
 
 94. Id. at 693 (“[T]he shift from pupil placement laws to freedom of choice plans . . . required 
the reconception of Brown’s mandate as requiring integration if litigation would end monochro-
matic schools. For a suit seeking this systemic relief to proceed as a class action, doctrine had to 
evolve.”). 
 95. See id. at 704–08 (describing the drafting process of Rule 23(b)(2)); see also Alexandra D. 
Lahav et al., Government Class Actions After Jennings v. Rodriguez, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 8, 
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/government-class-actions-after-jennings-v-rodriguez/ 
[https://perma.cc/7NKZ-ZGYT] (explaining that “the Committee members most responsible for the 
revised Rule 23 were ‘keenly interested’ in . . . attempts to use individual procedures to defeat de-
segregation class actions”). 
 96. Marcus, supra note 91, at 704. 
 97. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 163 (2015) 
(predicting that corporations will eventually be able to eliminate virtually all class actions suits 
through arbitration clauses). 
 98. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).  
 99. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (“Other courts have noted 
the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class actions entail . . . .”). 
 100. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 
2043–44 (2010) (“Class action lawyers are some of the most frequently derided players in our sys-
tem of civil litigation. The focus of this ire is usually the ‘take’ that class action lawyers receive 
from class action settlements.”). 
 101. Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 850 (2016) (“Not only does the 
current debate largely fail to reflect the function and importance of subtypes other than the aggre-
gated-damages class action, but more important, it also has produced across-the-board changes in 
class-action law that have made the purposes of the other subtypes more difficult to achieve.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification . . . .”).  
 103. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Carroll, supra note 101, at 876–90 (discussing the effects of Rule 23(f), as well as 
judicial trends that increased the burden of proof for class certification); see also Malveaux, supra 
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Over fifty years after the adoption of Rule 23(b)(2), a class of 
noncitizen detainees brought a (b)(2) class action challenging the fed-
eral government’s blanket refusal to hold individualized bond hearings 
before indefinitely detaining them in the course of immigration proceed-
ings.105 The Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez held that the Im-
migration and Nationality Act did not implicitly require individualized 
bond hearings every six months of detention.106 The Court declined to 
reach the detainees’ constitutional due process claims and remanded 
the case, instructing the Ninth Circuit to examine whether such claims 
could be adjudicated as a class action in the first place.107 Justice Sam-
uel Alito briefly remarked that class action treatment may not be ap-
propriate after Wal-Mart v. Dukes and that the flexibility of due process 
demands individualized assessments.108 
 If taken too far, the Court’s dicta and remand in Jennings could 
relegate the class action to its pre-1966 efficacy.109 Professor Arthur R. 
Miller, a pivotal member of the Committee, recently lamented the cur-
rent threats to the class action:  
[T]he demise of the class action would be completely at odds with the litigation system’s 
contemporary needs. In today’s world, a procedural system cannot function with a reason-
able degree of efficiency by processing a substantial number of overlapping or related 
claims one-by-one. Abandonment of the class action and other multi-party consolidation 
devices is not a reasonable option.110 
Regardless of the final outcome in Jennings, class actions have 
been undermined at the very same time commentators decrying univer-
sal injunctions have insisted on a greater reliance on them.111 The pro-
cedural choices for plaintiffs seeking systemwide relief are uncertain, 
especially if the universal injunction’s demise is impending.  
 
note 18, at 59–60 (listing hostility toward monetary relief, heightened standing requirements, and 
questioning of issue certification as additional hurdles in (b)(2) class actions).  
 105. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 838–39 (2018). 
 106. Id. at 851.  
 107. See id. (“When the District Court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) . . . it had their 
statutory challenge primarily in mind. Now that we have resolved that challenge, however, new 
questions emerge.”). 
 108. Id. at 851–52. But see id. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Every member of each class 
seeks the same relief (a bail hearing), every member has been denied that relief, and the differ-
ences in situation among members of the class are not relevant to their entitlement to a bail hear-
ing.”); KLONOFF, supra note 79, at 194 (noting that courts overwhelmingly hold that, unlike Rule 
23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(2) does not require that common issues predominate over individual issues).  
 109. See Carroll, supra note 101, at 850 (“[I]t is unclear whether the paradigmatic post-
Brown desegregation cases could be certified as class actions under today’s restrictive standards.”). 
 110. Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts for? Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 
78 LA. L. REV. 739, 763 (2018). 
 111. Malveaux, supra note 18, at 60; Morley, supra note 22, at 553. Some commentators op-
posed to universal injunctions note that if an individual plaintiff can secure a universal injunction 
that intentionally benefits nonparties, the 23(b)(2) class action is arguably superfluous. However, 
the necessity doctrine already treats class certification as superfluous in some situations. 
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II. THE CURRENT TRADEOFFS BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL CHOICES 
 This Part first situates universal injunctions within the broader 
procedural choices plaintiffs have to seek systemwide relief against fed-
eral executive action.112 It does so by examining two challenges to Pres-
ident Trump’s executive actions on asylum policy. Then, this Part con-
siders the costs and benefits of a universal injunction suit vis-à-vis a 
class action suit. This Part concludes that the preclusive asymmetry of 
universal injunctions makes them significantly less risky than a (b)(2) 
class action, which can bind all class members to an unfavorable out-
come. As a result, the current procedural choices are fundamentally 
misaligned; plaintiffs seeking systemwide relief are generally incentiv-
ized to choose a universal injunction suit over a class action suit.113 
A. Halting Executive Action via Universal Injunction 
1. The Case: East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump 
  On November 8, 2018, the Acting Attorney General and Secre-
tary of Homeland Security promulgated an interim final rule that ren-
dered categorically ineligible for asylum any person who entered the 
United States in violation of a presidential proclamation that limits the 
entry of aliens along the southern border.114 The stated purpose of the 
rule was to address the “urgent situation at the southern border,” where 
there had been a “significant increase in the number and percentage of 
 
KLONOFF, supra note 79, at 207. Courts invoking the necessity doctrine have refused to certify a 
class when an individual suit could achieve the same relief. See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 
1344, 1356–57 (1st Cir. 1985) (endorsing the necessity doctrine and seeing “no practical need for 
class certification” in the given case because the court could, among other considerations, “reason-
ably assume the good faith” of the enjoined government official in abiding by the injunction with 
respect to nonparties). 
 112. Professor Maureen Carroll wrote a prescient article prior to the rapid rise in universal 
injunctions that compares the structural disincentives plaintiffs have to pursue systemwide relief 
with a class action when “quasi-individual actions” could achieve the same result. Carroll, supra 
note 40, at 2020. 
 113. Professor Carroll came to the same conclusion even prior to the rapid rise of universal 
injunctions: “Notwithstanding the availability of Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs currently face a set of 
structural disincentives to class treatment that cause many of them to choose the individual form.” 
Id. at 2022. Professor Carroll proposes changes to class actions to realign the tradeoffs facing 
plaintiffs: expedited processes, reform of the necessity doctrine, and fee-shifting incentives. Id. at 
2075–81. In contrast, this Note proposes changes to how universal injunction suits are litigated. 
See infra Part IV. 
 114. Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures 
for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
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aliens who seek admission or unlawfully enter and then assert an intent 
to apply for asylum.”115  
On the same day, President Trump issued a presidential procla-
mation that limited alien entry into the United States along the south-
ern border to “any alien who enters the United States at a port of entry 
and properly presents for inspection.”116 So-called “caravans” of mi-
grants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were a popular 
talking point for the President before the 2018 midterm elections.117 
Taken together, the rule and the presidential proclamation rendered 
any asylum seeker who did not arrive to the United States at a port of 
entry categorically ineligible for asylum.118 
Four legal aid groups that assist asylum seekers immediately 
brought suit in the Northern District of California to challenge the ex-
ecutive actions.119 The legal aid groups asserted that the executive ac-
tions violated both the notice and comment provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (“APA”)120 and the Immigration and Nationality 
Act’s provision that any alien who is physically present in the United 
States may apply for asylum irrespective of whether they arrived at a 
port of entry.121 The groups had organizational standing because the 
asylum policy frustrated their mission of providing legal aid to asylum 
seekers, required diverting resources from other legal initiatives, and 
would cause the groups to lose substantial state funding.122 
 
 115. Id. at 55,944; see also E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (E. Bay II), 909 F.3d 1219, 
1230 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We have experienced a staggering increase in asylum applications. Ten years 
ago we received about 5,000 applications for asylum. In fiscal year 2018 we received about 97,000—
nearly a twenty-fold increase.”). 
 116. Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 57,661, 57,663 (Nov. 9, 2018). 
 117. See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 25, 2018, 11:31 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1055527191235227648 [https://perma.cc/T8X3-
YXFX] (“To those in the Caravan, turnaround, we are not letting people into the United States 
illegally. Go back to your Country and if you want, apply for citizenship like millions of others 
are doing!”). 
 118. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (E. Bay III), 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 
2018). 
 119. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, E. Bay III, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 
(No. 18-cv-06810) (“Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) because the defendants are agen-
cies of the United States and officers of the United States acting in their official capacity and 1) at 
least one plaintiff resides in this district . . . .”). 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 121. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012); see also E. Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(granting a temporary restraining order because “[t]he rule barring asylum for immigrants who 
enter the country outside a port of entry irreconcilably conflicts with the INA and the expressed 
intent of Congress. Whatever the scope of the President’s authority, he may not rewrite the immi-
gration laws to impose a condition that Congress has expressly forbidden.”). 
 122. E. Bay II, 909 F.3d 1219, 1241–44 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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 The court first granted a universal temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”),123 and then a universal preliminary injunction a month 
later.124 The court considered the usual factors for granting preliminary 
injunctive relief before turning to its scope.125 The court then provided 
almost all of the common reasons for enjoining the enforcement of the 
asylum policy against anyone, anywhere and not just against the four 
legal aid groups and their clients. First, the court noted that an injunc-
tion limited in geographic scope or to the alleged injuries would have 
given the groups’ clients “special rights that other immigrants would 
not have,” which conflicts with the need for uniformity in immigration 
law.126 Second, the court referenced the extent of the violation principle 
and held that, because the asylum policy was unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied to nonparties, a universal injunction was appropri-
ate.127 Third, the court interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in 
IRAP as an endorsement of the remedy.128 And finally, the court rea-
soned that the judicial review provision of the APA, which allows courts 
to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,”129 compels universal in-
junctions against invalid executive actions.130 
 The Ninth Circuit denied the government’s emergency motion 
to stay the universal TRO pending appeal.131 The court acknowledged 
“a growing uncertainty about the propriety of universal injunctions” but 
nonetheless concluded that the district court did not err in granting one 
because the government failed to show that a narrower remedy would 
have provided the legal aid groups with complete relief.132 The govern-
ment then applied to the Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal and 
 
 123. E. Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 868. 
 124. E. Bay III, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1121. 
 125. E. Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 855–66; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 126. E. Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 866 n.21. Many other courts have cited the need for uniformity 
in immigration law when granting universal injunctions. See, e.g., IRAP, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (relying on congressional intent that immigration laws be enforced uniformly).   
 127. E. Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 866 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). 
 128. Id. at 866–67. 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 130. E. Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 867 (citing Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
145 F.3d 1399, 1409–10 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). A few courts have treated granting universal injunctions 
as a matter of course in challenges to executive action under the APA. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles 
v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Ninth Circuit has also held that 
where an agency violates the APA, the district court is compelled to issue a nationwide injunc-
tion.”). But Professor Bray argues that neither universal injunctions nor even widespread agency 
rulemaking were contemplated when the APA was enacted, so the APA cannot be statutory au-
thority for universal injunctions. Bray, supra note 18, at 438 n.121; see also Siddique, supra note 
60, at 2120–26 (examining universal injunctions in APA cases). 
 131. E. Bay II, 909 F.3d 1219, 1256 (9th Cir. 2018). Ordinarily, a TRO is not an appealable 
order, but the Ninth Circuit treated the TRO as effectively a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1238–
39. 
 132. Id. at 1255–56. 
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was denied.133 President Trump decried the universal injunction and 
called the presiding district court judge who granted it an “Obama 
judge,” which earned the President a rebuke from Chief Justice Rob-
erts.134  
2. The Costs and Benefits of a Universal Injunction 
 The four legal aid groups in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant faced 
certain tradeoffs when they sought systemwide relief with a universal 
injunction suit instead of a class action suit. A plaintiff seeking a uni-
versal injunction has greater autonomy than a named plaintiff in a class 
action. Plaintiffs seeking a universal injunction are free to choose their 
attorney, but under Rule 23(g), the court appoints class counsel after 
assessing each counsel’s knowledge, experience, and resources.135 Class 
counsel not only represents the named plaintiffs but also serves as a 
fiduciary to the absent class members and must therefore “fairly and 
adequately” protect their interests.136 Plaintiffs seeking a universal in-
junction thus have a “significantly broader ability to shape the overall 
strategy of the litigation” than plaintiffs in a class action, who generally 
have little or no control over the suit.137 And as aforementioned, judges 
take a relatively more active role in supervising and guiding class ac-
tion litigation. Further, seeking a universal injunction is more expedi-
ent and cheaper than seeking a classwide injunction because the in-
creasingly rigorous evidentiary standards for the Rule 23 prerequisites 
have made class certification a “drawn-out procedural bog.”138 
Most importantly, harmed nonparties benefit from preclusive 
asymmetry when similarly situated plaintiffs seek a universal injunc-
tion.139 A universal injunction suit allows nonparties to benefit from a 
 
 133. Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant (E. Bay IV), 139 S. Ct. 782, 782 (mem.) (2018). 
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh would have granted the stay. Id. 
 134. Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap over Judges, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cf1e3deb6b84 
[https://perma.cc/YQG2-ZEX2] (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as saying, “We do not have Obama 
judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an extraordinary group 
of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those appearing before them.”). 
 135. Carroll, supra note 40, at 2028 (noting that courts usually select the named plaintiff’s 
counsel of choice). 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 137. Carroll, supra note 40, at 2030. 
 138. Id. at 2034–35 (quoting Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. 
CT. REV. 183, 208 (2009)).  
 139. Professor Richard Nagareda defines preclusive symmetry in the context of class actions 
as “an insistence that the plaintiff class ought not to be positioned to wield the bargaining leverage 
of a class-wide trial without, at the same time, affording to the defendant the assurance of a com-
mensurately binding victory were the defendant, rather than the plaintiff class, to prevail on the 
merits.” Nagareda, supra note 54, at 1113. 
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favorable outcome without being bound by an unfavorable one. That is, 
if the first plaintiff does not secure a universal injunction, a nonparty 
can seek an identical injunction in even the same forum because the 
federal government cannot invoke preclusion doctrines against them 
and the unfavorable outcome has no binding precedential authority 
across district courts.140 The federal government is therefore subject to 
potential “serial relitigation” until a universal injunction is finally 
granted.141 This preclusive asymmetry makes pursuing systemwide re-
lief through a universal injunction significantly less risky than pursu-
ing such relief through a (b)(2) class action, which binds all class mem-
bers to an unfavorable outcome.142  
For example, the four legal aid groups in East Bay Sanctuary 
Covenant were likely not the only groups in the United States to have 
their missions, resources, and funding put in jeopardy because of the 
new asylum policy. When the asylum policy was universally enjoined, 
nonparty groups enjoyed the remedial benefit of the suit without having 
to do anything and without the risk of being bound to a denial of a uni-
versal injunction. In other words, similarly situated legal aid groups 
enjoyed all the remedial reward without any preclusive risk. They 
would have been free to serially seek universal injunctions if the legal 
aid groups in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant did not prevail, deterred 
only by unfavorable persuasive precedent. 
B. Halting Executive Action via Class Action 
1. The Case: Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
 In May 2018, the Attorney General announced a “zero tolerance 
policy” under which all migrant adults entering the United States ille-
gally would be subject to prosecution and, if accompanied by a minor 
child, would be separated from that child.143 Executive officials vigor-
ously denied there was an “official” family separation policy, but leaked 
 
 140. See infra Section III.A. 
 141. Carroll, supra note 40, at 2020–21. Professor Bray colorfully describes preclusive asym-
metry as allowing parties to “shop ‘til the statute drops.” Bray, supra note 18, at 460. 
 142. Carroll, supra note 40, at 2038: 
A plaintiff might want to ensure that, even if he loses his own case, other potential 
claimants will be able to continue pressing the common claim against the defendant. 
Such relitigation will not be possible if the plaintiff obtains class certification, which 
results in “two-way preclusion” no matter whether the claim succeeds or fails on the 
merits.  
(quoting Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 
3056 (2013)).  
 143. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2018) 
(order granting plaintiff’s motion for classwide preliminary injunction); see also Jeff Sessions, U.S. 
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internal DHS memos144 and President Trump himself later revealed 
that officials believed the zero tolerance policy would have desirable de-
terrent and punitive effects.145 
 Fearing death in her home country of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, “Ms. L.” fled with her six-year-old daughter and arrived 
at a port of entry near San Diego seeking asylum.146 An asylum officer 
conducted a screening interview and determined that Ms. L. had a cred-
ible fear of persecution and a significant possibility of ultimately receiv-
ing asylum.147 After such a determination, asylum seekers are usually 
eligible for release from detention on parole.148 But Ms. L. and her 
daughter were detained and separated.149 Ms. L. was taken to a San 
Diego detention center and her young daughter was sent to a Chicago 
detention center for unaccompanied minors.150 The separation occurred 
without the required determination that Ms. L. was unfit or presented 
a danger to her daughter.151  
With Ms. L. as one of two named plaintiffs,152 the ACLU brought 
a putative class action against numerous government entities and offi-
cials alleging that the federal government had a systemwide practice of 
 
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Discussing the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the 
Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-ses-
sions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/NX8D-
34FA] (“If you are smuggling a child, then we will prosecute you and that child will be separated 
from you as required by law.”). 
 144. Eli Rosenberg, Senator Asks FBI for Perjury Investigation of Kirstjen Nielsen Over Family 
Separation Statements, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/2019/01/18/senator-asks-fbi-perjury-investigation-kirstjen-nielsen-over-family-separation-
statements/ [https://perma.cc/H66F-7Q62]. 
 145. Cf. Miriam Jordan, A Migrant Boy Rejoins His Mother, but He’s Not the Same, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/migrant-children-separation-anxi-
ety.html [https://perma.cc/8GSS-PLAQ] (“[M]any of the children released to their parents are ex-
hibiting signs of anxiety, introversion, regression and other mental health issues . . . .”). 
 146. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154 (S.D. Cal. 2018) 
(order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
 147. Id. at 1164. 
 148. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
¶ 54, Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. 18CV0428 DMS MDD), 2018 WL 1310160. 
 149. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 
 150. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
 151. Ms. L., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. 
 152. The other named plaintiff was Ms. C., a citizen of Brazil who entered the United States 
with her fourteen-year-old son but not at a port of entry like Ms. L. She was convicted of misde-
meanor illegal entry, served twenty-five days in federal custody, and was then taken into U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention for removal proceedings and considera-
tion of her asylum claim. Id. at 1155. During the five months she was in ICE detention, she spoke 
with her son on the phone only a few times. Id. 
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separating families without the required fitness determination in vio-
lation of the asylum seekers’ substantive due process rights.153 The 
Southern District of California held that the lawsuit met Rule 23’s pre-
requisites for class certification.154 The class met the numerosity re-
quirement because the proposed class definition covered as many as 
seven hundred separated families.155 The government vigorously dis-
puted that the commonality requirement was met, claiming that the 
individual circumstances of each separation were unique, as evidenced 
by the two named plaintiffs, Ms. L. and Ms. C.156 Ms. L. arrived in the 
United States at a port of entry, whereas Ms. C. did not.157 The court 
was not persuaded, however, and noted that commonality only requires 
a “single significant question of law or fact,” especially when the suit 
challenges a systemwide policy that violates the substantive due pro-
cess rights of all class members in a uniform way.158 
 The arguments that supported commonality also helped to sat-
isfy typicality. The court reasoned that the named plaintiffs and the 
absent class members would suffer the same injury: separation from 
their young children without the required fitness determination.159 The 
government argued that the named plaintiffs were not adequate repre-
sentatives because both of their claims were moot and the court lacked 
venue over Ms. C.’s claims.160 The court rejected these arguments, de-
termined there were no conflicts of interest between the named plain-
tiffs and the absent class members, and found that counsel for the 
 
 153. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA and the Asylum 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012), but stated a legally cognizable claim for violation of their substantive 
due process rights to family integrity under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1161–68. 
 154. Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 17, Ms. L. v. U.S Im-
migration & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Jun. 26, 2018). The class was 
slightly redefined from the plaintiffs’ proposed class and encompassed 
[a]ll adult parents who enter the United States at or between designated ports of entry 
who (1) have been, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by the DHS, and (2) 
have a minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in ORR 
custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody, absent a determination that the parent is 
unfit or presents a danger to the child.  
Id. 
 155. Id. at 7–8. 
 156. Id. at 9–10. 
 157. Id. at 9. 
 158. Id. at 12 (citation omitted). 
 159. Id. at 13–14.  
 160. Id. at 15. Both Ms. L. and Ms. C. had been reunited with their children prior to class 
certification, but the court applied the “voluntary cessation exception” because the government 
had not shown that the reunifications were for reasons other than the litigation. Ms. L. v. U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1156–58 (S.D. Cal. 2018). The court also held 
that venue is satisfied when at least one plaintiff meets the venue requirements, and there was no 
dispute that Ms. L. was a resident of the Southern District of California at the time the complaint 
was filed. Id. at 1158–59. 
       
2019] FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS 1699 
named plaintiffs would vigorously litigate the action.161 The court later 
granted a classwide preliminary injunction to “prohibit separation of 
class members from their children in the future absent a finding the 
parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child, and to require reunifi-
cation of these families once the parent is returned to immigration cus-
tody.”162 
2. The Costs and Benefits of a Classwide Injunction 
 Plaintiffs like Ms. L. and Ms. C. enjoy two benefits when they 
seek systemwide relief with a class action suit instead of a universal 
injunction suit. First, when plaintiffs seek a universal injunction, they 
face the risk that their claims could be mooted if the federal government 
stops subjecting them to the alleged harm. In contrast, when a court 
renders a named plaintiff’s case moot, a class action may continue if at 
least one absent class member continues to suffer harm.163 Second, 
when a court certifies a class and grants a classwide injunction, any and 
all class members can hold the government in contempt for violating 
the injunction and invoke preclusion doctrines in subsequent suits.164 
In contrast, when a court grants a universal injunction, only the plain-
tiffs can enforce the injunction and invoke preclusion doctrines even 
though the injunction remedially benefits nonparties.165 
 The biggest cost of pursuing systemwide relief with a class ac-
tion vis-à-vis a universal injunction is that the class members and the 
government are in preclusive symmetry. That is, if the named plaintiffs 
obtain class certification but then lose on the merits, the unfavorable 
outcome binds every class member who now cannot relitigate.166 If the 
goal is to obtain systemwide relief, a class action loss can be devastat-
ing. Therefore, despite the two benefits enjoyed by class action plain-
tiffs, the current procedural choices are fundamentally misaligned; 
plaintiffs seeking systemwide relief are generally incentivized to choose 
a less risky, cheaper, and more autonomous universal injunction suit 
over a class action suit.  
 
 161. Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 14–15, Ms. L. v. U.S 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Jun. 26, 2018). 
 162. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (S.D. Cal. 2018).  
 163. Carroll, supra note 40, at 2036–38. 
 164. Id. at 2038.  
 165. Frost, supra note 18, at 1114 n.217 (“Nonparties to a nationwide injunction cannot seek 
to have the defendant held in contempt for violating the injunction . . . nor can they assert res 
judicata in subsequent litigation.”). 
 166. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (“If the federal courts are 
to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree when ren-
dered must bind all of the class properly represented.”); see also Carroll, supra note 40, at 2038. 
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III. POSSIBLE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UNIVERSAL 
INJUNCTIONS 
 Professor Sam Bray proposes a brightline rule against universal 
injunctions based on the absence of such injunctions in the early history 
of equity.167 Justice Clarence Thomas relied heavily on Bray’s historical 
account in his Trump v. Hawaii concurrence to conclude that universal 
injunctions are “legally and historically dubious.”168 Professor Bray ex-
plains: “Protecting nonparties with an injunction is a remedial choice. 
It is a relatively new choice, and like all remedial choices, it needs to be 
justified.”169 
 This Part answers Professor Bray’s invitation for a justification. 
Commentators have thus far justified universal injunctions on mostly 
pragmatic grounds: they promote uniformity; protect people from immi-
nent and irreparable harm; avoid inefficient, duplicative litigation; and 
circumvent plaintiff-detection problems.170 However, these pragmatic 
justifications take as given the assumption that nonparties benefitting 
from litigation is unfamiliar. On the contrary, the preclusive asym-
metry of universal injunctions is not unfamiliar. Judges and rulemak-
ers grappled with preclusion asymmetry when developing issue preclu-
sion doctrine and drafting the modern class action rules. This Part 
recounts these two contexts and considers if they can help determine 
the propriety of universal injunctions.171 
A. Lessons from Preclusion Law 
1. Nonmutual Offensive Issue Preclusion 
 The preclusive asymmetry and wider policy tradeoffs of univer-
sal injunctions are familiar. They are the same tradeoffs relevant when 
 
 167. Bray, supra note 18, at 469 (proposing the following brightline rule: “A federal court 
should give an injunction that protects the plaintiff vis-à-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff 
and the defendant may both happen to be. The injunction should not constrain the defendant’s 
conduct vis-à-vis nonparties.”); see also Sessions, supra note 25 (“In the first 175 years of this Re-
public, not a single judge issued [a universal injunction].”). 
 168. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 169. Bray, supra note 18, at 457. 
 170. See Amdur & Hausman, supra note 34, at 51 (“[W]hat Bray calls the ‘epistemic ad-
vantages’ of narrow relief—slower deliberation, more forums and judges weighing in—do not al-
ways outweigh the need to prevent real-world harm.”); Frost, supra note 18, at 1090–1101; Mal-
veaux, supra note 18, at 58. 
 171.  Two forthcoming articles have analogized preclusion doctrine to universal injunctions but 
did not consider spurious class actions and counterarguments to the analogy. Clopton, supra note 
29; Trammell, supra note 29.  
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crafting issue preclusion doctrines.172 Issue preclusion prohibits a party 
from relitigating an issue in a subsequent suit when the issue was ac-
tually litigated, actually decided, and essential to the judgment in a 
prior suit.173 Issue preclusion can apply even when the subsequent suit 
is filed in a different jurisdiction, which is akin to a universal injunction 
benefiting anyone, anywhere.174  
Initially, issue preclusion required mutuality; only the parties or 
their privies in a first suit could later invoke and benefit from the judg-
ment in a subsequent suit.175 In other words, nonparties were not bound 
by adverse judgments, but they could not benefit from favorable ones 
either. The Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement for 
issue preclusion in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.176 A class of Parklane 
shareholders sued Parklane for making materially misleading state-
ments in a proxy statement related to a merger.177 Before the share-
holder class action went to trial, the SEC also sued Parklane and ob-
tained a declaratory judgment that the proxy statement was materially 
misleading.178 The shareholders asserted that Parklane was precluded 
from religitating whether the proxy statement was materially mislead-
ing even though they were not parties in the SEC suit.179 The Court 
held that the Parklane shareholders could invoke and benefit from the 
favorable declaratory judgment in the SEC suit because Parklane had 
its day in court, did not prevail, and should not get a second bite at the 
apple.180 
 The Court did, however, impose some limits on when nonparties 
like the Parklane shareholders could invoke offensive issue preclusion: 
“[I]n cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action 
or . . . the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defend-
 
 172. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 296 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manion, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“A nationwide injunction is similar in effect to nonmutual offensive 
collateral estoppel . . . .”), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 
WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 
2018). 
 173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); 18 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416 (3d ed. 2018). 
 174. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 173, § 4416. 
 175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 173, § 4416. 
 176. 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). The Court endorsed defensive nonmutual issue preclusion in 
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
 177. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324. 
 178. Id. at 324–25. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 332–33. 
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ant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estop-
pel.”181 This general rule is supplemented by numerous factors to deter-
mine whether the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked had 
a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issue in the first suit and 
whether the party invoking issue preclusion was an opportunistic “wait-
and-see” observer of the first suit.182 In sum, the Parklane Court had 
good reasons to issue a brightline rule against nonmutual offensive is-
sue preclusion but chose not to do so. Instead, the Court left the decision 
of whether to apply issue preclusion in particular cases to judicial dis-
cretion.183 
 The development of issue preclusion doctrine did not end with 
Parklane. In United States v. Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that 
private parties cannot invoke nonmutual offensive issue preclusion 
against the federal government.184 As a result, in a subsequent suit 
against a different party, the federal government is free to relitigate 
issues it has previously lost. Universal injunctions are arguably incon-
sistent with Mendoza.185 They subject the federal government to de 
facto issue preclusion because it cannot enforce a given executive action 
against anyone, anywhere.186 
 However, neither historical limits on judicial power nor the 
structure of the federal courts motivated the decision in Mendoza. The 
Court exempted the federal government from nonmutual offensive is-
sue preclusion for four policy reasons.187 First, the government litigates 
far more than any private party and the suits often carry great public 
 
 181. Id. at 331. 
 182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28–29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see also Park-
lane, 439 U.S. at 329–33: 
If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have 
little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable . . . . 
Still another situation where it might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the 
second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first 
action that could readily cause a different result. 
 183. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. 
 184. 464 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1984). 
 185. Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the 
Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 627–31 (2017). But see Frost, supra note 18, at 1112–14 (argu-
ing that Mendoza's rejection of nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not “demand a similar 
prohibition” against universal injunctions because the government is still free to litigate cases in 
which it lost and was subject to a universal injunction, like the Muslim Ban and sanctuary city 
cases). 
 186. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 296–97 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manion, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, 
No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 
(7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018); Frost, supra note 18, at 1112–13. 
 187. See Morley, supra note 185, at 627–30. 
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importance.188 Second, private parties invoking preclusion against the 
government would stymie percolation and make it harder for the Su-
preme Court to decide when to grant certiorari.189 Third, the govern-
ment would lose its wide discretion in deciding which adverse judg-
ments to appeal.190 Fourth, subjecting the government to nonmutual 
offensive issue preclusion would impede successive executive branches 
from adopting different legal positions than their predecessors.191 
In sum, the development of issue preclusion doctrine in Parklane 
and Mendoza suggests two broad points that can inform the discussion 
on the propriety of universal injunctions. First, the question of who can 
enjoy the preclusive benefit of litigation is left to judicial discretion. Sec-
ond, courts balanced the competing policy concerns of fairness, uni-
formity, efficiency, error costs, and percolation. 
2. The Spurious Class Action 
 The preclusion asymmetry produced by universal injunctions 
was once a common feature of class actions. The class action as it ex-
isted in 1938 came in three types based on the rights at issue: true, 
hybrid, and spurious.192 Unlike true and hybrid class action members, 
only class members who opted in to spurious class actions were bound 
by and could benefit from the judgment.193 The original motivation for 
the opt-in feature was to allow class members to “intervene on an ancil-
lary basis without being required to show an independent basis of 
[f]ederal jurisdiction, and have the benefit of the date of the commence-
ment of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations.”194 But as 
Professor Brian Fitzpatrick notes, most courts allowed class members 
 
 188. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159–60. 
 189. Id. at 160. 
 190. Id. at 161 (“[T]he Solicitor General considers a variety of factors, such as the limited re-
sources of the Government and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal.”). 
 191. Id. 
 192. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 600 (2013). In a “true” class action, the rights sought to be enforced were 
shared rights and joinder of all class members was required to adjudicate those shared rights like, 
for example, in a shareholder derivative action. Id. In a “hybrid” class action, the rights of the class 
members could be several, not joint, and would often relate to the equitable distribution of property 
like a fund. Id. The “spurious” class action was designed to enforce the rights of class members 
with no previous association “where there was a common question of law or fact affecting such 
rights and ‘common relief’ was sought.” Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 175 
(1970). 
 193. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments; see also Marcus, supra 
note 192, at 600–01. 
 194. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments. 
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to opt in after a judgment.195 Thus, “wait-and-see” class members could 
opt in to a favorable outcome but, in the case of an unfavorable outcome, 
could decline to opt in and relitigate on their own.196 This is the same 
kind of preclusive asymmetry produced by universal injunctions. 
 Charles Alan Wright, a pivotal member of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules (“Committee”), called the spurious class action “a 
particularly puzzling creation” because its preclusive asymmetry made 
a “mockery” out of the class action.197 Just like universal injunctions are 
viewed as unfair to the federal government, spurious class actions were 
viewed by many on the Committee as unfair to corporate defendants.198 
To that effect, the opt-in spurious class action was eliminated and the 
opt-out (b)(3) class action was adopted in 1966.199 The new rule bound 
all class members to both favorable and unfavorable outcomes unless 
they affirmatively opted out. Corporate defendants soon realized the 
immense power of the opt-out class action to aggregate low value claims 
that would never have been brought individually and expose them to 
“bet-the-company” liability.200 The corporate community has since con-
sistently supported a return to the spurious class action.201  
 
 195. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ironic History of Rule 23 9–10 (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-41, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3020306 [https://perma.cc/V6QL-TP3L]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note to 1966 amendments:  
Hitherto, in a few actions conducted as “spurious” class actions . . . courts have held or 
intimated that class members might be permitted to intervene after a decision on the 
merits favorable to their interests, in order to secure the benefits of the decision for 
themselves, although they would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable decision. 
 196. Fitzpatrick, supra note 195, at 10. 
 197. Wright, supra note 192, at 175, 181. 
 198. Fitzpatrick, supra note 195, at 10. When the Committee reconvened in 1960, it was so 
intent on eliminating the spurious class action that the first version of the (b)(3) class action did 
not allow for any opt-out whatsoever. Id. at 4.  
 199. Id. at 4; see also John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 
3, 17 (1983): 
[T]o remove the lack of mutuality and unfairness to the defendant inherent in “one-way 
intervention,” the new procedural rule would require, prior to determination of liability, 
notice to all class members. This notice was to inform all class members that the court 
would “exclude” them if they so request; and if they did not “request exclusion,” the 
class judgment would include them. In short, the members’ formal power-duty of “ex-
clusion” or in legal slang, “right to opt out” was born. 
 200. Fitzpatrick, supra note 195, at 7; see also Miller, supra note 110, at 754: 
Surely the Committee members could not have foreseen what was to come in the fol-
lowing decades: the explosive recognition of new substantive rights by federal and state 
statutes and judicial activity . . . and the frequency—let alone the character—of product 
and commercial failures and other adverse events that would give rise to aggregate 
litigation. 
 201. Fitzpatrick, supra note 195, at 7, 17–18. 
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B. Possible Conclusions 
   The development of issue preclusion doctrine and the drafting of 
the modern class action rules provide, at best, a mixed bag of possible 
conclusions that can inform the discussion on the propriety of universal 
injunctions and justify universal injunctions on theoretical grounds. 
   At one extreme, nonmutual offensive issue preclusion may justify 
universal injunctions because, at bottom, they both determine if and 
how nonparties benefit from and are bound by litigation. If nonparties 
can enjoy the preclusive and precedential benefits of a suit, they should 
be able to enjoy its remedial benefits as well. And just like universal 
injunctions, issue preclusion effectively binds horizontally situated and 
even vertically situated courts in other geographic jurisdictions.202 
   But the parallel between preclusive benefits and remedial bene-
fits may be unpersuasive for three reasons. First, after Mendoza, non-
parties cannot enjoy the preclusive benefits of a prior suit against the 
federal government, and arguably, should not enjoy the remedial bene-
fits of a universal injunction against the federal government either.203 
Second, to enjoy the benefits of preclusion, or even just favorable prec-
edent, a nonparty must take the affirmative step of filing a subsequent 
suit and asking the subsequent court to apply the prior judgment or 
precedent. To enjoy the remedial benefits of a universal injunction, a 
nonparty does not have to do anything. Third, the remedial benefits for 
nonparties are in the discretion of the court that is granting a universal 
injunction, whereas a subsequent court determines the preclusive ben-
efits for nonparties. That is, a court cannot predetermine the preclusive 
effect of its own judgment like it determines the scope of its equitable 
relief. Thus, these fundamental differences between the binding effects 
of injunctions, preclusion, and precedent and how these effects are trig-
gered may make the parallel between issue preclusion and injunctions 
unpersuasive.204 
 
 202. Morley, supra note 185, at 640–41: 
The res judicata effect of a judgment is not subject to geographic limits. A litigant may 
invoke the res judicata effect of a federal court’s judgment in any court as a matter of 
federal common law, and of a state court’s judgment as a matter of full faith and credit. 
(footnote omitted).  
 203. Clopton, supra note 29 (manuscript at 3). Professor Clopton has argued that Mendoza 
was a policy-driven decision that should be overruled, which would temper courts’ penchant for 
granting universal injunctions. Id.; see also Zachary D. Clopton, Arguments About Nationwide In-
junctions, TAKE CARE BLOG (July 16, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/arguments-about-na-
tionwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/LXP6-G5UM]. But see sources cited supra note 185. 
 204. For a broader discussion of the relationship between injunctions, preclusion, and prece-
dent, see Morley, supra note 185, at 643–47.  
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At the other extreme, the elimination of the spurious class action 
because of its preclusive asymmetry may justify a brightline rule 
against universal injunctions. But there are key differences between 
spurious class actions and universal injunctions that may undermine 
this conclusion. Once class members opted in to a class action, they 
could sue to hold the opposing party in contempt for violating an injunc-
tion and could assert issue preclusion against them in subsequent 
suits.205 In contrast, nonparties enjoying the remedial benefits of a uni-
versal injunction do not have these powers. These powers made spuri-
ous class actions arguably more unfair than universal injunctions and 
justified their demise; perhaps universal injunctions, which are rela-
tively less unfair, should be spared. 
At the very least, the development of issue preclusion doctrine 
and the drafting of the modern class action rules suggest that historical 
limits on judicial power and the structure of the federal courts alone 
should not conclusively point to a brightline rule against universal in-
junctions.206 Justice Thomas surmised that “no persuasive defense has 
yet been offered” for universal injunctions because they “boil down to a 
policy judgment about how powers ought to be allocated among our 
three branches of government.”207 But the endorsement of nonmutual 
offensive issue preclusion in Parklane and exempting the federal gov-
ernment from it in Mendoza were policy judgments that balanced fair-
ness, uniformity, percolation, error costs, and efficiency.208 These same 
policy considerations should be balanced in the current context of inad-
equate checks on growing executive power, the erosion of the political 
process, and the slow demise of the class action to assess if and how 
nonparties should enjoy the remedial benefits of universal injunctions. 
IV. AN EXTRAORDINARY FORUM FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY 
 Under the assumption that the theoretical justifications for uni-
versal injunctions in Part III are persuasive, two pressing problems still 
 
 205. Frost, supra note 18, at 1114 n.217. 
 206. Clopton, supra note 29 (manuscript at 44). 
 207. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (“Defenders of these injunctions contend that they ensure that individuals 
who did not challenge a law are treated the same as plaintiffs who did, and that universal injunc-
tions give the judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch.”). 
 208. See Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A 
Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1096 (2017) (“The systemic policy considerations 
weighed in Mendoza mirror the key policy considerations on nationwide injunctions. The Court’s 
analysis framed the issue as pitting uniformity and efficiency against percolation and intercircuit 
dialogue.”). 
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remain.209 First, plaintiffs not only forum shop but also judge shop when 
seeking universal injunctions because of the indeterminate equitable 
principles for crafting the scope of injunctions and the numerous venues 
where the federal government can be sued.210 Second, universal injunc-
tions produce a preclusive asymmetry whereby a nonparty is not bound 
by an unfavorable outcome but nonetheless benefits from a favorable 
one. This forces the federal government to potentially serially relitigate 
suits it has already won and to appeal every universal injunction that 
is granted against it.211 While permitting nonparties to enjoy the reme-
dial benefits of a universal injunction may not itself be problematic,212 
subjecting the federal government to serial relitigation across the coun-
try until a single district court judge finally grants a universal injunc-
tion is undesirable. 
 A specialized forum to adjudicate suits seeking universal in-
junctions against federal executive action would eliminate judge shop-
ping and mitigate preclusive asymmetry. The court would be composed 
of twelve “borrowed” federal district court judges—one from each geo-
graphic circuit—appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
to serve two-year terms. The suits would be randomly assigned to three-
judge panels. The order granting or denying the injunction would be 
reviewable on direct appeal to the Supreme Court.213 Other litigants 
would still be free to seek narrower relief through the normal course of 
litigation in federal district courts across the country. 
 
 209. Many commentators oppose universal injunctions on constitutional grounds, so the pro-
cedural fix presented here is likely a non-starter for these commenators. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 
18, at 471–72 (arguing that Article III forbids universal injunctions); Morley, supra note 22, at 
523–27 (same); Wasserman, supra note 5, at 364: 
Universal injunctions are inappropriate because a court should not prohibit govern-
ment from enforcing the challenged laws, regulations, or policies beyond the named 
plaintiffs. They therefore are inappropriate whether issued by one district judge in the 
Western District of Washington, issued by a three-judge district court, affirmed by a 
panel of a regional court of appeals, affirmed by an en banc court of appeals, or affirmed 
by a unanimous Supreme Court. 
 210. See supra Section I.A. 
 211. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 212. See supra Part III. 
 213. If this Note’s proposed forum is established by Congress, it would be subject to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1253 (2012), which states that “any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order grant-
ing or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil 
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district 
court of three judges.”  
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A. Precedent for a Specialized Forum 
 The American judiciary has been generally reticent toward spe-
cialized214 forums.215 Such forums—including courts that only hear con-
stitutional challenges to national legislation—are more common inter-
nationally.216 Specialized forum proposals usually involve a specific 
subject matter, courts with rotating panels of judges, or assignment of 
specific cases to judges with subject matter expertise.217  
 There are specialized federal trial courts composed of “bor-
rowed” Article III judges.218 For example, the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court (“FISA”) is composed of eleven judges from districts 
across the country who review warrant applications for electronic sur-
veillance of foreign intelligence information.219 Appeals from warrant 
denials are heard by the FISA Court of Review, which is composed of 
three district court or court of appeals judges.220 The judges on both 
courts are chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to serve 
seven-year terms.221 This Note’s proposed forum shares many of the 
overall features of the FISA Court: twelve borrowed district court 
judges—one from each geographic circuit—that would be appointed by 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to serve two-year terms. 
 
 214. “Specialization” is not easily defined. This Note uses the term to describe a new forum 
that would only adjudicate suits seeking universal injunctions against federal executive action. 
 215. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 84 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 FJC REPORT], https://www.fjc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/2012/StrucAlt.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9YZ-9GLV]; Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal 
Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial 
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 786 (1983); Diane P. Wood, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at the Southern Methodist Uni-
versity School of Law (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756 (1997). 
 216.  Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts, 17 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 122 (2014) (“Many other nations have established a standing court [to 
hear] constitutional challenges to legislation of the national government. Indeed, there has been 
an increasing trend toward greater use of this centralized method of judicial review, as compared 
to the typically decentralized path of constitutional litigation in the United States.”). 
 217. See generally Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 
522–23 (2008) (“Proposals over the years advocating for additional specialized courts have been 
consistently ignored, whether in scientific evidence, tax, immigration, administrative agency re-
view, patents, or other areas.”). 
 218. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 14–15 tbl.1.2 (2011). For a list of abolished 
specialized federal courts (for example, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals), see id. at 17 
tbl.1.4. Freestanding courts have their own permanent judges who hear only cases on the given 
specialized court. Borrowed judges serve both in their home district court and on the specialized 
court. See id. at 14–15 tbl.1.2. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. 
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 There is some precedent for three-judge panels adjudicating the 
very types of claims and rights at issue in universal injunction suits.222 
After Ex parte Young,223 Congress permitted only three-judge panels to 
grant interlocutory injunctive relief against a state official enforcing an 
allegedly unconstitutional state statute with direct review by the Su-
preme Court.224 The three-judge panel requirement was expanded in 
1937 to suits seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of alleg-
edly unconstitutional federal statutes.225 Congress believed that “a sin-
gle federal judge should not have the power to enjoin a federal enact-
ment,” a common refrain from universal injunction critics.226 The 
administrative difficulties of convening three-judge panels and the in-
creased docket pressure on the Supreme Court’s then-larger caseload 
led Congress to abolish three-judge panels in all but a few areas in 
1976.227 Today, three-judge panels are used to adjudicate challenges to 
redistricting plans, voting law changes under the Voting Rights Act, 
and challenges under certain statutes with a three-judge panel review 
provision like the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.228 
B. A Specialized Forum as a Solution 
 This Note is not the first proposal of a single forum for universal 
injunction suits.229 The APPEAL Act was a recently proposed fix.230 The 
Act would give the District Court for the District of Columbia exclusive 
original jurisdiction “to hear and determine any claim that arises in a 
 
 222. It is important to note, however, that the three-judge panels discussed herein adjudicated 
the constitutionality of state and federal statutes and not the kind of executive actions at issue in 
most universal injunctions suits today. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4234 (3d ed. 2018) (noting that Congress’s 1937 expansion of three-judge panels 
to suits challenging the constitutionality of federal statues “did not reach attacks on federal ad-
ministrative orders.”). 
 223. 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908). 
 224. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557, requiring that applications for  
interlocutory injunction[s] suspending . . . the enforcement, operation, or execution of 
any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such State . . . be pre-
sented to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or to a circuit 
judge . . . and the other two may be either circuit or district judges. 
 225. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch.754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752–53. 
 226. Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and 
the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 420 (2019). 
 227. Solimine, supra note 216, at 125–27. 
 228. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 226, at 420–21. 
 229. Cf. Judge Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. 
REV. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-
injunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/558J-JK9L]. Judge Costa proposes a return to the three-
judge panels that heard constitutional challenges to federal statutes from 1937 to 1976. Id. 
 230. Assigning Proper Placement of Executive Action Lawsuits Act (“APPEAL Act”), H.R. 
2660, 115th Cong. (2017).  
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case or controversy as to an Executive order, action, or memoran-
dum.”231 The D.C. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia are de facto specialized forums because adminis-
trative law cases are an outsized portion of their dockets.232 Challenges 
to agency actions are litigated in the D.C. Circuit because there are nu-
merous organic agency statutes that vest the D.C. Circuit with exclu-
sive or concurrent jurisdiction over such challenges.233 These organic 
agency statutes and the APPEAL Act itself suggest that Congress is 
comfortable with prioritizing uniformity over percolation on certain le-
gal questions by channeling them to a single forum.234 
 This Note’s proposed forum is an improvement on the APPEAL 
Act, which is plagued by some of the common disadvantages of special-
ized forums. One of these disadvantages is undermining judicial inde-
pendence: the Act would subject the D.C. Circuit’s judges to increased 
political pressure and even more politicized nomination processes.235 
The Act would also add to the large concentration of judicial power in 
the D.C. Circuit and undermine Congress’s attempt to decrease the 
caseload of the D.C. courts when it amended the venue statute in 
1962.236 Finally, the APPEAL Act would likely give the federal govern-
ment a repeat-player advantage because it would repeatedly litigate 
universal injunction suits in front of the same few judges.237 
This Note’s proposed forum also eliminates judge shopping and 
mitigates the preclusion asymmetry of universal injunctions. Plaintiffs 
would have randomly assigned three-judge panels hear their case and 
 
 231. Id. § 2. 
 232. BAUM, supra note 218, at 11 (“[A]dministrative appeals are twice as plentiful on the 
docket of the D.C. Circuit as a proportion of all cases as they are in the other circuits. But they 
still constitute only about one-third of all cases in the D.C. Circuit . . . .”). 
 233. See Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 131, 143 (2013) (noting that there are “more than 150 statutory provisions that specifically 
refer to the D.C. Circuit, with over 130 of these specifically relating to jurisdiction”). 
 234. Not only is Congress amenable to certain legal questions being decided in a single, spe-
cialized forum, it has also increasingly enacted specialized constitutional review provisions which 
require all constitutional challenges under the given statute to be heard by three-judge panels 
followed by direct review in the Supreme Court. See generally Solimine, supra note 216, at 128–32 
(listing statutes with specialized constitutional review provisions). Therefore, Congress is amend-
able to the two salient features of this Note’s proposal: a single, specialized forum for certain legal 
questions and three-judge panels.  
 235. Cheng, supra note 217, at 552 (“Specialized courts are susceptible to other forms of polit-
icization as well. The political branches of government can more effectively control specialized 
courts through monitoring, budgeting, and other forms of pressure.”). 
 236. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 237. 1993 FJC REPORT, supra note 215, at 85 (“Regardless of whether the parties are inclined 
or able to influence the appointment process, the experience of litigating before the same judges 
over and over gives the frequent litigant the advantage of familiarity and predictability.”). How-
ever, the litigants that often seek universal injunctions against the federal government—large 
public interest groups and state attorneys general—are repeat players themselves. 
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could no longer handpick judges in specific judicial districts who may 
hold outlier views. Furthermore, nonparties would still enjoy the reme-
dial benefits of a universal injunction granted by the specialized forum. 
However, a single forum makes plaintiffs significantly less inclined to 
serially relitigate denials of universal injunctions because a single un-
favorable outcome would create precedent for the forum.238 In other 
words, nonparties would continue to benefit from a favorable outcome 
but would now be bound through precedent to an unfavorable one as 
well.239 
There are additional benefits to the proposed forum beyond elim-
inating judge shopping and mitigating the preclusive asymmetry of uni-
versal injunctions. The forum would eliminate the potential for conflict-
ing injunctions240 and dramatically decrease the overall frequency of 
them.241 There would be greater public confidence in universal injunc-
tions granted by a three-judge panel rather than a single outlier judge, 
an original motivation for such panels in 1910 and 1937.242 
The forum would also lead to better judicial decisionmaking for 
two reasons. First, the court would slow down the current race to the 
courthouse after an allegedly illegal executive action goes into effect. 
Public interest groups and state attorneys general would have to decide 
which plaintiff is best positioned to file the all-important first suit. Sec-
ond, judges are currently considering the universal scope of injunctions 
 
 238. See Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 581 (2017) 
(“Horizontal stare decisis refers to one court’s obligation to follow its own precedents. Here, the 
variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is significantly greater. Decisions of federal district 
courts, for instance, are not binding even within that district; such precedent is only persuasive.”). 
 239. While decisions of federal district courts are not binding even within the district, the spe-
cialized forum could instead follow the lead of many U.S. Courts of Appeals and view its decisions 
as binding precedent. See id. at 581–82: 
[P]anels of any given U.S. Court of Appeals follow a rule of absolute stare decisis within 
the circuit, such that one panel may not overrule an earlier panel decision. The theory 
is that the panel generates the opinion of the court, and that opinion is binding within 
(but not outside of) the circuit. 
 240. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 208, at 1088 (“A recent example of territorial conflict occurred 
in Washington v. Trump, when a federal court in Boston refused to enjoin the travel ban, but was 
functionally overruled by the nationwide injunction issued by another federal court of ostensibly 
equal stature.”); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 241. Even defenders of universal injunctions agree that they should be extraordinary reme-
dies. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 18, at 1115–16 (“Critics are correct that federal district judges at 
times issue nationwide injunctions unthinkingly, assuming that if a federal policy is unlawful then 
its enforcement must be enjoined as to everyone. . . . [N]ationwide injunctions come with signifi-
cant costs, and in many circumstances they may be unnecessary and inappropriate.”). 
 242. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 222, at § 4234 (“It was the thought of Congress that there 
would be less public resentment if enforcement of the state statute were stayed by three judges 
rather than one, and that the provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court would provide 
speedy review.”); see also supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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as a mere afterthought or not at all.243 In contrast, a three-judge panel 
tasked specifically with determining the propriety of an injunction and 
its scope would take greater care in applying the aforementioned equi-
table principles and likely develop a robust body of law to determine 
when universal injunctions should be granted.244  
C. The Percolation Problem 
The main disadvantage of a specialized forum for universal in-
junctions is that such a court would not restore the common law “per-
colation”245 of legal issues that universal injunctions currently sty-
mie.246 Percolation produces circuit splits, which helps the Supreme 
Court decide which novel questions of law need resolution.247  
 Although percolation is an important benefit of a decentralized 
common law system, it may not be very beneficial in universal injunc-
tion suits. Percolation is most valuable when novel legal questions arise 
in various factual contexts.248 But universal injunction cases often in-
volve narrow questions of law regarding a systemwide and uniform gov-
ernment policies.249 As the Seventh Circuit explained when upholding 
 
 243. Berger, supra note 208, at 1071 (“Despite the far-reaching impact of nationwide injunc-
tions, courts often treat injunctive scope as an afterthought, sometimes discussing it only in a short 
paragraph, sentence, or footnote.”). 
 244. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 245. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have in 
many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ 
in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a better informed and 
more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”).  
 246. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[Universal] 
injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system—preventing legal questions 
from percolating through the federal courts,  encouraging forum shopping, and making every case 
a national emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch.”). But see Amdur & Hausman, 
supra note 34, at 53 n.27 (observing that “nationwide injunctions do not always foreclose percola-
tion” and listing concurrent suits involving the Muslim Ban and sanctuary cities). 
 247. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing circuit splits as one factor in the decision whether to grant 
certiorari). 
 248. See California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 583 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[N]ationwide injunctive relief 
may be inappropriate where a regulatory challenge involves important or difficult questions of 
law, which might benefit from development in different factual contexts and in multiple decisions 
by the various courts of appeals.” (quoting L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 
(9th Cir. 2011))). But see Malveaux, supra note 18, at 58: 
How much time and how many decisions are reasonable for percolation? How important 
are factual records when the Court is ruling on the validity of a government’s uniform 
conduct or policy? And how justified is delay in the face of instability, uncertainty, and 
harm that may result? Incrementalism has its costs too. 
 249. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 292 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The public inter-
est would be ill-served here by requiring simultaneous litigation of this narrow question of law in 
countless jurisdictions. . . . This is not a situation in which courts would be able to benefit from 
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a universal injunction in a “facial challenge to a policy applied nation-
wide”: 
There are some legal issues which benefit from consideration in multiple courts—such as 
issues as to the reasonableness of searches or the excessiveness of force—for which the 
context of different factual scenarios will better inform the legal principle. But a determi-
nation as to the plain meaning of a sentence in a statute is not such an issue. For that 
issue, the duplication of litigation will have little, if any, beneficial effect.250 
Even if percolation is important in universal injunction suits, 
the numerous amici curiae and intervenors that often participate in 
such suits—and the three-judge panels of the proposed forum—can 
serve as the “many minds” of common law percolation.251 For example, 
thirty-seven cities and counties, the United States Conference of 
Mayors (representing 1,400 cities nationwide), fourteen states, and the 
District of Columbia participated as amici or attempted intervenors in 
a Seventh Circuit case seeking a universal injunction against changes 
to a federal grant program that would prohibit sanctuary cities from 
receiving federal criminal justice funding.252 
 But even if this Note’s proposed forum were rejected in favor of 
a brightline rule against universal injunctions, lost percolation would 
not be restored. The parties now relying on universal injunctions would 
instead rely on nationwide class actions, a practice endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in Califano v. Yamasaki.253 While the Court was sympa-
thetic to the loss of percolation that nationwide class actions cause, it 
determined that this did not counsel for a brightline rule against na-
tionwide class actions.254 Thus, the endorsement of nationwide class ac-
tions in Califano and nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in Parklane 
 
perusing the decisions of other courts in the matter.”), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion va-
cated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), and vacated, No. 17-2991, 
2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018). 
 250. Id. at 290–91. But see id. at 297 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):  
Different parties litigating the same issues in different forums will likely engage differ-
ent arguments, leading to diverse analyses and enhancing the likelihood of the strong-
est arguments coming to the fore. Courts faced with difficult statutory questions are 
the ones who benefit the most from the existence of multiple well-reasoned decisions 
from which to draw. 
 251. See, e.g., E. Bay III, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Court also permit-
ted six amicus curiae to file briefs in support of an injunction.”). 
 252. City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 278, 292. 
 253. 442 U.S. 682, 701–03 (1979). For example, the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart v. Dukes sought 
injunctive (and monetary) relief through a nationwide 23(b)(2) class action encompassing all fe-
male Wal-Mart employees. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345–46, 360 (2011). 
 254. Califano, 442 U.S. at 702–03; see also Morley, supra note 22, at 541–43. 
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suggests that percolation is an important but not dispositive policy con-
cern. The Supreme Court and Congress255 have determined that perco-
lation does not always outweigh competing concerns in the past and 
would have to do so again to save universal injunctions.256 
A second disadvantage of the proposed forum is that the Chief 
Justice may be inclined to nominate district court judges to the forum 
that would either never grant universal injunctions or always do so. For 
example, Chief Justice Roberts has been criticized for appointing judges 
to the FISA Court that would more easily approve a warrant.257 Never-
theless, the alternative—plaintiffs handpicking their judge because of 
his perceived outlier views—is much worse.  
CONCLUSION 
If the universal injunction’s demise is impending and the class 
action’s demise continues unabated, obtaining systemwide relief 
against invalid federal executive action will become difficult. Universal 
injunctions allow nonparties to benefit from a favorable outcome but 
not be bound by an unfavorable one. This makes universal injunctions 
less risky than class actions, which always bind absent class members 
after class certification.  
This Note argues that this preclusive asymmetry is not unfamil-
iar and may not justify a brightline rule against universal injunctions. 
The policy considerations of fairness, uniformity, percolation, error 
costs, and efficiency that were balanced in the development of issue pre-
clusion doctrine and the drafting of the modern class action rules should 
again be balanced in the current context of inadequate checks on grow-
ing executive power, the erosion of the political process, and the slow 
demise of the class action to assess the propriety of universal injunc-
tions. If universal injunctions can be saved, they should be adjudicated 
in a single, specialized forum that would eliminate judge shopping and 
mitigate their preclusive asymmetry. The forum would realign the 
 
 255. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 256. Amdur & Hausman, supra note 34, at 52–53 (“Even Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author 
of United States v. Mendoza, the Supreme Court’s most explicit pro-percolation case—subse-
quently criticized the notion of percolation for percolation’s sake.” (footnote omitted)). 
 257. Charlie Savage, Roberts’s Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 
25, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/politics/robertss-picks-reshaping-secret-sur-
veillance-court.html [https://perma.cc/Q3DT-PS3G]. 
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tradeoffs that plaintiffs consider when choosing how to seek systemwide 
relief. 
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